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Background: Informal payments for health care, which are common in many countries, can have negative 
effects on health care access, equity and health status as they lead people to forgo or delay seeking care, 
or to sell assets to pay for care. Many countries are putting reforms in place with the aim of reducing 
informal payments. In order to be successful, such policies should be informed by the underlying causes 
of such payments. This study attempts to explore why, how, and in what ways informal payments occur.
Methods: We conducted face-to-face interviews with a purposeful sample of 45 participants, including 
patients, healthcare providers and officials, in Kerman province in Iran, in 2010. The research participants 
were asked about the nature of informal payments, the reasons behind both asking and making those 
payments. We analysed the data using content analysis.
Results: We found that people make informal payments for several reasons, namely cultural, quality-
related and legal. Providers ask for informal payments because of tariffs, structural and moral reasons, 
and to demonstrate their competence. Informal payments were found to be more prevalent for complex 
procedures and are usually asked for directly.
Conclusion: Informal payments are present in Iran’s health system as in other countries. What makes 
Iran’s condition slightly different from other countries is the peculiarity of reasons behind asking informal 
payments and the disadvantages associated with these kinds of payments. Iran could overcome this 
dilemma by precise investigation of the reasons to inform appropriate policy formulation. Some policies 
such as raising salaries, justifying the tariffs and cost-sharing, defining a benefits package of services, and 
improving accountability and transparency in the health system could be taken by the government to 
alleviate the problem.
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Background
In recent years, there has been an increasing trend in out-
of-pocket payments in Iran. This can be explained in part by 
inflation, technological advancement and epidemiological 
transitions, but it is also due to an increase in the practice of 
informal charges being demanded by physicians (1). Informal 
payments; the money paid to doctors for services outside of the 
framework of formal tariffs (2), or charges which patients pay in 
addition to the formal tariffs, are a widespread phenomenon (1). 
These payments are one of the many  coping  strategies adopted 
by medical staff and patients,  in countries  where  health 
systems are underfunded, overstaffed, and burdened with broad 
mandates promising free access to care (3). Informal payments 
in the health sector are becoming an increasingly urgent 
and debated issue, especially in developing and transitional 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU); Central, Eastern  and Southern Asia; Africa 
and South America (4). These wide spread phenomena have 
been estimated to constitute 10% to 45% of total out-of-pocket 
expenditure on healthcare in many low-income countries (2). 
Similar calculations for many other countries show that a lot of 
money that could save lives, prevent suffering and treat pain is 
currently being wasted due to excessive costs  (5). In Poland, 
informal payments have been estimated to come to as much as 
twice the value of physicians’ salaries (6); in Bangladesh, earnings 
from unofficial charges exceed official salaries by a factor of ten 
(7,8), and in Cambodia, by a factor of five (9). Evidence on the 
existence of informal payments has been reported in at least 22 
studies (10), almost all of which concern low-income countries 
(8).
While some patients give informal payments willingly, such 
as to express gratitude or expedite care, other patients feel 
compelled to make these ‘unofficial’ payments in order to obtain 
a higher quality of service or even any care at all (11). With 
patients paying informally to jump the queue, receive better 
service or more care, such payments have the potential to limit 
access to healthcare services to patients who have a greater ability 
to pay, rather than those with the greatest need (2). Informal 
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payments can also cause people to forgo or delay care, sell assets 
in order to obtain care, and lose faith in the health system (12). 
In addition to increasing health costs, these under-the-table 
payments also develop distrust among public to the medical 
professionals, and damage the doctor-patient relationship (1). 
They also jeopardize governments’ attempts to improve equity 
and access to care, and policies targeted at helping the poor 
(2). It is well documented that informal patient payments are 
seen as a negative feature of health care provision due to their 
adverse effects on equity and the fact that they can hinder the 
determination of the future funding requirements of the health 
care sector (13–16). Receiving under-the-table payments is 
illegal in some countries and can lead to prosecution by the 
police for example in Tanzania (8). In some countries, a special 
phone number can be used to report such behaviour (1).
Some studies have shown that the quality of clinical care is 
affected by informal payments, for example family members 
giving injections to avoid paying nurses, and doctors 
recommending procedures that will increase their income rather 
than choosing them for their therapeutic benefit (3). Informal 
payments in government-run facilities also negatively impact 
health financing systems, draining revenue that is needed to 
support public sector goals and activities (17).
Some researchers have also documented some positive 
aspects of informal payments including creating continuous 
relationships between patients and providers, improving staff 
morale, keeping health workers from leaving the public system, 
and allowing patients to show their respect to providers with 
whom they feel pleased (5). Although the importance of data 
on informal patient payments is universally recognized, there 
have been few attempts to study this phenomenon, especially in 
the context of Iran (1,18). This might be due to the challenges 
involved in data collection, given the informal and potentially 
sensitive nature of the topic (3,19,20). To fill this knowledge gap, 
this paper aimed to identify the motivations behind informal 
payments in Iran, how informal payments are perceived and why 
they are made in the health system of Iran from the perspectives 
of patients, health care providers and officials.
In what follows a brief sketch of the Iranian health system is 
provided before elaborating on the research methods. This will 
be followed by presenting the research results and a put forward 
the discussion and conclusion.
Health system in Iran 
Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MOHME) 
is in charge of Iran’s health system and all decisions for 
governance, policy making, planning and implementing the 
policies are centrally made by the MOHME. At the next level, 
medical universities are in charge of providing health services, 
supervising private sector, training medical sciences students, 
and conducting medical and health research in their catchment 
area. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affair (MoLSA) is 
another main stakeholder in Iran’s health system with its role in 
financing health services specially at the secondary and tertiary 
levels. Although there is High Council of Medical Services 
Insurance (headed by the MOHME), which is the responsible 
entity for setting annual medical tariffs; the private sector does not 
apply the tariffs consistently. High Council of Medical Services 
Insurance enjoys members from both ministries (MOHME and 
MoLSA) and other stakeholders including medical council (21). 
Iran’s health system has undergone a major reform in order to 
revolutionize health system, under this reform family physician 
plan has been launched in rural areas since 2005. This reform 
mainly seeks to strengthen referral system, to enhance health 
equity, and to break financial relation of physician and patient 
which might have some positive effects on informal payments 
(22).
Methods
We adopted a qualitative research stance in which we 
interviewed with consumers, providers and officials from 
public and private sectors, teaching and non-teaching facilities 
in Kerman province. We selected face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews because individual interviews usually help the 
researches to investigate personal experiences of individuals in 
more depth (3). Face-to-face interviews are also considered the 
most suitable approach when aiming to gain an understanding of 
what respondents mean (23). Moreover, this made triangulation 
of the data possible through the participation of all parties (i.e. 
consumers, health care providers and officials).
Sampling
 We applied the purposive method using the following criteria 
for each group: consumers (service utilization, willingness 
to participate), providers (related experience, willingness to 
participate, being actively engaged in service provision), and 
officials (related experience, willingness to participate). We also 
applied snowball sampling whenever necessary. We interviewed 
a purposive sample of 45 participants according to “the 
predefined criteria” (90% response rate) who were identified in 
consultation with a member of the Kerman Medical Council, 
two hospital executives, one former member of the council and 
the interviewees. The participants were invited through phone 
calls, followed by letters containing the research objectives and 
interview questions. 
Forty five face-to-face interviews (comprising 30 patients [P], 
12 providers [Pr] and 3 officials [Of]) were conducted in 2010, 
and were tape-recorded and transcribed. Each interview lasted 
between 10 and 50 minutes. Two of the authors of this paper 
(A.E and F.R) conducted all of the interviews. The interview 
questions were designed so that they captured the opinions 
and beliefs of the participants regarding different aspects of 
informal payments in Kerman province. In order to gain a 
better understanding of the context, the first two interviews 
were conducted in depth as a pilot. These helped us to prepare a 
suitable set of questions for the later semi-structured interviews.
We had an interview guide which was almost the same for 
various groups of our participants; the first part of the interview 
for all groups contained questions on demographics. The 
patients were then questioned about whether they have paid 
informal payments, after explaining the definition of informal 
payment by the interviewers. The final section of the interview 
guide for all groups consisted of open-ended questions seeking 
why patients give informal payments to the providers and why 
the providers ask for them.
Ethical considerations
 The participation in the study  was voluntary, verbal consent 
was sought prior to the study and voices were recorded only 
if the participants agreed. Additionally, we removed parts of 
interviews in which there were some information which could 
lead to identification of third parties.
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Data analysis
 All interviews were transcribed into Persian, while listening 
to the audio-tapes and concurrently checking against the notes 
taken during the interview. The transcriptions were then read 
through while listening to the audio-tape, to ensure accuracy 
of transcription. All of these Persian transcripts were then 
translated into English by the authors (M.A and A.E). However, 
some sections of the Persian transcripts were translated 
separately by other authors, and some were back-translated 
to confirm linguistic consistency, and the precision of the 
translation to ensure credibility of translation. We analysed the 
data using content analysis.
Results
Interviewees’ demographic characteristics are shown in 
Table 1. The data analysis yielded five main themes in relation 
to informal payments. These themes cover issues such as the 
reason for paying and asking informal payments, the services 
more susceptible for asking informal payments, the mechanism 
of asking such payments and the disadvantages associated with 
them, which are described in detail in the following sections:
i) Why informal payments are paid?
This  section  focuses on  the reasons  behind  patients offering 
informal payments, either voluntarily or mandatorily. It reflects 
the views expressed in the interviews conducted with consumers. 
We classified these reasons under three main categories: cultural, 
quality-related and legal factors, which are elaborated on below.
Cultural factors
Several cultural aspects lead people to make informal 
payments, some of which can be attributed to broad cultural 
aspects with a long history that have been internalized in the 
day-to-day activities and lives of the people. Cultural factors 
behind informal payments include:
Expression of gratitude
The consumers believed that when someone does a good thing 
for you, you have to do your best for him/her. The consumers 
stated that they would provide informal payments as an 
expression of gratitude if the provider did not directly ask for: 
“I myself gave the physician a gold coin, because he didn’t ask me” P3; “I 
will give a gift to the surgeon who performed the operation for my mother” 
P12; “if there is serious surgery and they save a patient’s life, people feel 
they have to provide a gift to show their appreciation” P25.
Importance of health
The consumers regarded health as the most important asset 
any individual possesses. This is emphasized in Iran’s tradition 
and culture, so that people are ready to pay money to maintain 
or restore their health: “You have to pay, after all there is nothing more 
important than health” P14; “it is not important how much (money) you 
have, when you are not healthy” P30.
Presence of an offering culture 
In Iran, and especially in Kerman province, a phenomenon 
called an “offering culture” is prevalent in which people are 
reluctant to say no to requests, even if they know they are not 
legal. This is especially true of physicians’ requests: “when the 
doctor asked me to pay extra, I could not say no to him, although I knew 
it was illegal” P1; “it is not moral to file a claim, just for monetary issues, 
Table 1. Characteristics of interviewees
Variables N %
Interviewees
Patients 30 67
Providers 12 27
Officials 3 6
Gender
Male 30 67
Female 15 33
Age Group
20-35 10 22
36-50 25 56
51-65 8 18
> 65 2 4
against a doctor who has helped me” P10.
Lack of public awareness of their rights
Informal payments are often made because people are not 
aware of their rights and assume they have to pay any money 
the physician asks them for: “I thought it was part of the treatment 
charge” P16; “I did not think they were asking for extra” P11.
Quality-related factors
Besides cultural factors, several quality-related factors urge 
people to make informal payments. They often make informal 
payments to avoid being treated by students, to jump the queue, 
to receive customized services, or to be treated by a well-known 
physician: “I paid in order not to be operated by resident physicians 
” P2; “… the physician asked me to pay extra otherwise I would have 
had to wait some months” P28; “… I could be operated on by another 
surgeon, but I paid under-the-table to be operated on by this well-known 
surgeon” P6. Other consumers reported having a sense of fear or 
insecurity, which made them pay extra, for example: “I was afraid 
what would happen to my mother if I did not agree to pay extra” P8. 
Others wished to receive special attention from providers, with 
one patient claiming “I paid the nurse to provide better care for my 
daughter” P17.
Legal factors
We also noticed that there were some instances where the 
patients knew that they did not have to pay extra, but still paid 
because they believed both the law and the complaints process 
to be insufficient: “Since there is no efficient monitoring, we have got 
used to make such payments” P27; “physicians support each other and 
are integrated. I am not optimistic about the legal system” P13. Others 
said that they could not complain because they did not have any 
evidence: “I do not have any evidence to complain. Although I paid, I 
don’t know how to prove it” P20. On the other hand, some patients 
did not complain because they were afraid of not receiving 
complete care if they did so: “I would like to complain, but if I do, he 
might not treat me” P21; “what if I need to go to his office again?” P18.
ii) Why informal payments are requested?
Our study revealed four set of factors behind providers asking 
for informal payments: these are tariff-related, structural, and 
moral factors as well as to show competence.
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Tariff-related factors
The providers interviewed for this study claimed that the tariffs 
set by  the Insurance  Supreme  Assembly  are  unrealistic, 
insufficient, inequitable and lack sufficient monitoring. They 
hold the view that they are underpaid and therefore have to 
complement their salaries with under-the-table payments: 
“official tariffs do not compensate our expenses” Pr10; “when I compare 
myself with other professions, I just don’t feel I have been treated 
equitably” Pr4. Others claimed that the Assembly consciously 
sets unrealistic tariffs because of a lack of resources: “tariffs are set 
based on insurance funds not on real costs” Pr1.
Structural factors
Factors pertinent to the structure of health system can be 
categorized under structural factors. Factors such as laws, the 
direct patient-physician relationship, the health sector’s low 
share of GDP, the presence of discrimination in the medical 
community, delays by insurance companies in paying charges, 
and an inappropriate insurance approach, can all be put into 
this category. One official stated “health’s share of GDP is very low 
and there are not sufficient resources” Of1. Another official asserted 
“our insurance companies are just a median for money transition. No 
policy making or planning happens within them” Of2.  Although some 
participants took the view that the financing system paves the 
way for providers to ask for extra money: “the direct financial 
patient-physician relationship facilitates asking for informal payments” 
Pr7, others claimed that it is the inter-profession discrimination 
[i.e. an increasing income gap between different groups of the 
medical profession] that cultivates an environment in which 
informal payments are asked for: “even in the medical profession, 
there is some discrimination that make physicians ask for informal 
payments” Pr6.
Moral factors
Some participants held the view that the underfunded health 
system, unrealistic tariffs and other factors were not reasonable 
excuses for charging patients extra informal fees, claiming that 
physicians should have professional morals. They suggested that 
morals are a strong factor prohibiting providers from asking for 
illegal payments: “morals are the strongest mechanism to control” Of3. 
Other participants also implied that the problem of informal 
payments originates from the dilution of professional morals: 
“professional morals have been diluted and money dominates everywhere” 
Of2; “some physicians have enough money to have a good living, they just 
want more” Pr2.
To show their competence
An interesting reason for asking for informal payments, 
mentioned by some of the participants, was the view that this 
will reinforce the perceived competence and quality of the 
physician’s services. One official said “I know some physicians who 
ask for informal payments just to show patients that they are competent” 
Pr9. This was also highlighted in one of the interviews with the 
patients: “one tends to think the physician who doesn’t ask for extra 
money isn’t skillful, or might not look after patients very well” P3.
iii) How payments are made?
Because of the illegal nature of informal payments, we could 
not gain suitable insights from our interviews of providers 
and officials into how these payments are made, and therefore 
confined ourselves to investigating this issue in the consumer 
interviews. Several methods were mentioned, including cash 
payments and being given an account number into which the 
payment should be made. Most of the time, the physicians asked 
for informal payments indirectly: “the secretary asked me to make 
informal payments for a cesarean section”  P7; “the surgeon introduced 
me to someone else who I had to pay”  P19. Another participant 
declared “we needed our certificate to get signed; he didn’t sign it in the 
public hospital and asked us to come to his office, where he signed it after 
being paid” P23.
iv) The services for which informal payments are made
Although informal payments are pervasive among several 
groups of providers, this study showed that they are particularly 
common in the case of complex or difficult services such as 
surgery, cardiovascular procedures, orthopedics and the like. 
One general physician claimed “general physicians don’t take 
informal payments, but specialists, surgeons with a higher reputation ask 
for high informal payments” Pr12. Two of the patients interviewed 
made the following comments: “obstetricians ask for high informal 
payments for curettage” P26; “my uncle cut the tendons on his hands and 
the orthopedist asked him to pay extra on top of the hospital bill, to be 
operated on” P15.
v) The disadvantages of informal payments
In general, almost all the participants agreed that informal 
payments are not desirable; each group viewed the disadvantages 
from their own point of view. Generally speaking, their opinions 
can be categorized under three main categories: harm to the 
patient-physician relationship, harm to the performance of the 
health system and feeling guilty by providers.
Harm to the physician-patient relationship
The most likely effect of such payments is that they destroy 
patient-physician relationships. A decrease in patients’ trust 
of physicians and destruction of the ‘saintliness’ of the medical 
profession were among the most important adverse effects 
mentioned: “this type of monetary patient-physician relationship is 
deteriorating public trust in physicians” Pr5. One patient expressed 
the view that asking for or receiving informal payments will not 
only develop patient distrust in that physician in particular, but 
will also have an adverse effect on the medical community as a 
whole: “… this way, the whole medical community will be implicated, 
although most of them have good intentions” P5.
Harm to the performance of the health system
Another adverse effect of informal payments is the harm they 
impose on the overall performance of the health system, through 
increasing out-of-pocket payments, possibly preventing some 
patients from using health services and even exposing some 
households to catastrophic healthcare expenditure. One of the 
interviewees asserted that informal payments destroy health 
system performance as they prevent funds from flowing into the 
health system: “these funds are received by individual physicians and, 
in practice, do not flow into the health system, so they are destructive 
rather than constructive”  Of3. Another issue is the long term 
consequences on the health system and society: “when people 
pay under-the-table payments, no money is left for food. In this way his/
her children become ill due to malnutrition and this will start a vicious 
circle, which will impose heavy costs on the health system” Of2. These 
payments can also harm the health system by worsening health 
inequities, as expressed by one interviewee: “it is unfair to force 
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someone who does not have any money to pay extra for the sake of his/
her own or his/her family’s health” Pr11.
Feeling guilty by providers
The interview account revealed that one of the unique 
disadvantages in Iran of such payments originates in the 
country’s religious beliefs, which consider receiving such money 
to be forbidden (Haraam). The participants indicated that most 
physicians are unhappy about receiving such payments and 
some are concerned about their afterlife: “… one of disadvantages 
is the personal issues, since this money is not Halal” Of2; “if you ask any 
Ayatollah, they will say that since it is illegal it is religiously forbidden 
(Haraam) too” Of2.
Discussion
Our study indicates that informal payments are present in 
Iran’s health system as in other countries. We have explored the 
phenomenon in the context of Iran’s health system by involving 
three main stakeholders. Previous studies have reported that 
people make informal payments to express gratitude (3,24,25), 
to get additional or better services (3,26), or because of cultural 
norms ingrained in their tradition, and weak laws (25). This 
study indicates that all of the above mentioned factors affect 
patients’ decisions to make such payments, although some of 
them seem to play a more important role. 
Some people might pay medical staff informally because they 
feel they should pay or because they have problems differentiating 
between formal and informal payments (11) but, according to 
our study, there are also some instances where people know 
they do not have to pay but still do so. As well as quality-related 
factors and a desire to jump the queue or express their gratitude, 
some agree to make informal payments because they believe 
the law is weak or because they are reluctant to ignore a request 
from their physician (known as the offering culture in Iran, and 
particularly evident in Kerman province) (27).
The literature suggests that underfunding of the health system 
(28) and insufficient official payments to providers (8) are 
the most important supply-side factors leading to informal 
payments. Our study not only confirms this but also reveals 
another interesting factor; we discovered that some physicians 
ask for extra money simply to create the idea among their patients 
that they are a high-quality practitioner. They are afraid that if 
they do not ask for extra money, they may lose their patients. 
However; this claim has still to be investigated, as to whether it 
is a leading factor behind asking for informal payments, or just 
one among many. 
Under-the-table payments have important adverse effects for 
all the parties involved. For example, they can prevent patients 
from receiving care (5), distort the flow of funds within the 
health system (28), and increase inequalities in health (11). Even 
providers do not necessarily welcome them, as they are illegal, 
and can engender a sense of fear and guilt among those who 
receive them (1). The presence of an agreement regarding the 
disadvantages of such payments among the main stakeholders 
provides an opportunity to develop strategies and interventions 
to overcome this alarming phenomenon. These should focus 
on addressing the structural issues of the health system rather 
than preventing or punishing individual instances of informal 
payments (8).
In spite of widespread awareness of the disadvantaged of 
informal payments, such payments have not been diminished, 
although there has been some success. Any efforts designed to 
overcome the issue of informal payments will fail unless based 
on a systematic approach. We believe that any strategy aimed 
at decreasing informal payments must consider the whole 
picture or it will certainly fail. Iran’s health system has some 
long standing financial problems, which are the result of the war 
imposed on it. During the years of war, defence was prioritized 
and all national resources were mobilized to defend the country. 
Since the war ended, the health sector has never been able to 
obtain its fair share from the public purse (21,29). As a result, 
the health sector has always been underfunded and payments 
to physicians and other health service providers are not realistic 
and do not compensate them appropriately for their efforts. As 
we have identified in this study, if the Iranian health system 
can increase its financial resources, we would be optimistic of 
seeing an end to the majority of informal payments. This could 
be complemented with other necessary actions, such as, refining 
the current attitudes and beliefs of the general public and 
providers regarding the perceived advantages of and reasons 
for requesting or making informal payments (specially cultural 
and social factors) and strengthening the monitoring system for 
providers to improve the accountability of public work. 
Limitations 
The most important limitation of the present study is the fact 
that because of the illegal nature of informal payments, we could 
not study all aspects of informal payments. Dabalen and Wane 
state that informal patient payments are a sensitive research topic 
due to their illegality in some countries. This implies that there 
may be difficulties in estimating their real scope and magnitude, 
and above all difficulties in determining the frequency of their 
occurrence (24).
Additionally, this study was carried out in Kerman province, 
located at south east of Iran, so this might not be a representative 
picture of informal payment status in Iran.
Conclusion 
This study suggests that Informal payments in Iran are a 
multifactorial phenomenon with different players who have 
their own share in it. Different factors such as moral, religious 
and legal issues are behind informal payments in Iran, which 
are asking serious efforts by the government to build future 
interventions to reduce these payments. Some policies such as 
raising salaries, justifying the tariffs and cost-sharing, defining 
a benefits package of services, and improving accountability 
and transparency in the health system could be taken by the 
government to alleviate the problem.
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